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The Internet is often presented as an ensemble of connected net-works without any form of hierarchy – a totally horizontal systemconnecting individual machines to each other. However, it is much
more structured and hierarchical than it seems because of the character-
istics of its “logical” architecture, and the technical norms and standards
that enable the smooth circulation of digital content on these networks.
In particular, there needs to be one single addressing system to identify
the localisation of every device connected to the network. For this purpose,
every connected device is attributed with a unique number, or IP address.
For example, the IP address of the French Centre for Research on Contem-
porary China’s website server is 203.90.226.135. IP addresses are difficult
to understand and memorise by (human) Internet users, so to facilitate the
identification of a website’s location, websites are generally registered under
a domain name, such as “cefc.com.hk.” The Domain Name System (DNS)
functions as a directory that associates a domain name with the IP address
of the website’s server. It thus plays a crucial role in routing Internet traffic
to the right location. 
Because these names and numbers require global coordination, they are
called “critical resources” of the Internet. (1) The allocation of IP addresses
and domain names is currently managed through a global set of institutions
coordinated from the United States by the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN). The distribution of domain names and the
maintenance of accurate and up-to-date records globally involve hundreds
of public and private institutions, which run thousands of servers around
the world for this sole purpose.
Domain names are increasingly used as marketing tools that serve to at-
tract audiences through a logical, understandable, appealing name. They are
important to businesses, governments, NGOs, independent journalists, and
individuals alike for creating a stable identity online. However they can be
squatted on, hijacked, faked, or even censored. As a consequence, the oper-
ation of the DNS around the world is an essential though largely unknown
political stake that involves issues of cybersecurity, intellectual property,
and free speech, to mention but a few.
For this reason, the Domain Name System has become an essential part
of both the domestic and international Internet policy of the Chinese gov-
ernment. Ever since the early days, Chinese people and administrations in
charge of the management of the Chinese Domain Name System were
caught in an apparent contradiction. On the one hand, participation in the
global Domain Name System is indispensable to the connection of the Chi-
nese Internet with the global network, and thus to its actual qualification as
part of the “Internet” rather than a separate “Intranet.” On the other hand,
the Chinese government routinely uses domain names and IP addresses to
block access to foreign websites as part of the so-called Great Firewall, one
of the most infamous aspects of Internet censorship in China. It is an early
example of a more general tendency among countries to tamper with the
universality of DNS records, to “localise” Internet content, or to selectively
restrict access to certain websites in the name of national sovereignty. This
tension between the need to achieve global connectivity and the will to
maintain control was also reflected in China’s critical position towards the
institutions in charge of the DNS globally, such as ICANN, while they always
maintained a certain level of participation in critical discussions and working
groups.  
This article aims at documenting the implementation of the Chinese Do-
main Name System in coordination and in tension with the global Domain
Name System. The first part explains what the Domain Name System is and
how it is an essential element of the Chinese government’s efforts to control
online information. The second part is a chronological account of the im-
plementation of the Chinese Domain Name System. While the technological
development of the Chinese Domain Name System is largely due to the
participation and cooperation of Chinese engineers in international net-
works all through the 1990s and 2000s, China’s political leaders put more
emphasis on the affirmation of “cyber-sovereignty” by centralising regula-
tory powers domestically and by calling for more intergovernmental gov-
ernance on the international stage. In the third part, I focus on the specific
case of the development of Chinese-character domain names in the 2000s,
which further exemplifies how China has managed to defend its interests
through the consolidation of its domestic Domain Name System while tak-
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ing an active part in the global technical and governance debates that mat-
ter most to it. As showed in the fourth part, in more recent years this en-
hanced participation of Chinese leaders in Internet governance institutions
such as ICANN also reveals a more confident and assertive behaviour, as
the growth of the Chinese Internet has put them in a more dominating po-
sition.
The material used in this enquiry is composed of press articles and official
announcements, regulatory documents, official websites, and interviews
conducted in Beijing in November 2014 with current and former members
of related institutions such as the Chinese Academy of Sciences, ICANN,
the Chinese Internet Network Information Center, and the Ministry of In-
dustry and Information Technologies. 
A localised Internet: Information control and
the Domain Name System
Domain names and the Great Firewall of China
The DNS is politically important for many reasons, not least because it is
one of the technical tools used to block access to foreign websites through
their domain name or IP address. This is done through Internet service
providers (ISPs), such as China Telecom and China Unicom, at various levels,
including backbone networks and international interconnections, and using
a variety of technologies. (2) The authorities provide ISPs with lists of IP ad-
dresses and domain names that they must block. (3) When an Internet user
types a blocked website’s address into his browser, he will then be routed
by ISPs to the wrong website or to an error page, typically “Error 404 Page
Not Found.” 
This type of blocking through the DNS system can also have intentional
or unintentional side effects. There are many cases of “overblocking,” where
entire blog platforms (or other content platforms) are blocked as the result
of the targeting of a single page. (4) More strikingly, occasional errors in the
manipulation of DNS records can lead to embarrassing episodes where a
large portion of Chinese Internet traffic is mistakenly routed to overseas
servers hosting the websites of dissident organisations, causing the crash
of these servers and a major disruption of Internet service for affected users
in China. (5)
There are various ways to access a website with a blocked domain name.
First, one can still directly input the numerical IP address of the website, at
least until the IP address is blocked as well, in which case it may be possible
to view the website via a “proxy” server; that is, a computer situated abroad,
which forwards the content of the requested website without showing its
domain name or IP of origin. This works until this particular proxy is identi-
fied and blacklisted as well. An even more efficient way is to use a “virtual
private network” (VPN), which on top of connecting the user with a server
abroad also encrypts content. Again, this comes down to a cat-and-mouse
game until the VPN is also blocked.
DNS blocking is only one aspect of a much broader array of censorship
technologies used by China, and in fact, is not even the most powerful one (6)
compared with keyword filtering, which applies to all content circulating in
and outside of China, and with the control of content that is exercised by
all self-expression platforms such as Weibo or blogs. But it is one of the
most visible and symbolical tools as seen from abroad, because it potentially
enables China to “cut off” the country from the global Internet. This is why
the Chinese Internet censorship system is often nicknamed the “Great Fire-
wall” (7) of China, symbolically representing a virtual “fence” around the
country, or compared to a giant “Intranet.” This metaphor may in fact be
too strong, since the blocking’s very purpose is to enable selective access
to the global Internet rather than blocking it altogether. 
China is often accused of using blocking against foreign tech companies
such as Google or Facebook to favour the development of local champi-
ons. (8) Indeed, this blocking poses a dilemma to foreign companies: either
they comply with Chinese censorship laws and hide certain content to Chi-
nese users, with huge consequences in terms of reputation and trust at
home, or they risk completely losing the opportunity to tap into the Chinese
market. (9) The decision by Google to finally leave the Chinese market in
2010 was a case in point. (10)
In that regard it must be noted that the use of domain name blocking
through local ISPs is not a specificity of China, although the country cham-
pions it. Many countries, including democratic countries, have adopted such
measures in the name of protecting their citizens against content deemed
illegal (copyright, (11) child pornography, etc.) or morally unacceptable (reli-
gion, (12) pornography, (13) etc.). The specificities of China and other authori-
tarian countries in that regard may be the extensive focus on blocking
political websites, the particularly blurry legal framework and opaque deci-
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sion-making, as well as the absence of appeal, all of which come down to
the absence of true rule of law. 
Nonetheless this global pattern of domain name blocking is part of a
strong trend towards more “localisation” of the Internet for a variety of legal,
cultural, and marketing reasons. (14) Alongside blocking measures, more and
more governments are calling for local storage of data out of cybersecurity
concerns. (15) Many companies fear the prosecution of their overseas em-
ployees for hosting content considered blasphemous, pornographic, or re-
visionist in various countries, and have decided to censor content according
to specific countries. (16) Copyright issues also motivate content providers
to limit the availability of cultural products, such as TV programs, to one
specific country. In addition, for more efficiency, most services adapt their
webpages to the viewers’ supposed preferences in terms of language, cur-
rency, or tastes. As a result, Internet users do not automatically have access
to a single global Internet; in other words, the Internet is displayed in a dif-
ferent way to each individual, sometimes without his knowledge or consent. 
Some Internet rights defence organisations and activists have criticised this
localisation trend as a threat to “break” the Internet, because its value lies
precisely in the openness and equal treatment of users and data (“net neu-
trality”). (17) On the other hand, a recent editorial of the Chinese Global Times
praised localisation as “inevitable,” for “if the Internet is truly global, it has
to strike a balance between different demands from different societies.” (18)
Registration of domain names in China
Another way the Domain Name System is used to control and “localise”
online activities is through the registration of domain names in China.
The global Domain Name System is coordinated from California by the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), a not-for-
profit private corporation. ICANN delegates the day-to-day maintenance
of specific “top-level domain names” (TLD) to other organisations called
“registries,” such as Verisign (“.com”) or Public Interest Registry (“.org”). In
the case of “country-code top-level domain names” (ccTLD, such as “.fr” for
France or “.de” for Germany), the delegation is granted to local organisations
in accordance with the government of the country or territory. For China,
the “.cn” extension is currently delegated to the state-sponsored China In-
ternet Network Information Center (CNNIC). 
Like most registries, CNNIC does not provide domain name registration
service directly to customers. It just maintains the domain name database
for the extension “.cn,” and accredits intermediary companies (“registrars”)
to provide the registration service to website owners. 
The Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information Technologies (MIIT, for-
merly Ministry of Information Industry, MII) regulates this system through
the 2004 China Internet Domain Name Regulation. (19) Article 11 states that
“any organization that applies for setting up Domain Name Registry or Reg-
istrar within the territory of the People’s Republic of China shall be approved
by MII.” Both registries and registrars must set up their servers within the
territory of the PRC and employ qualified personnel. Among other technical
requirements, both must pledge to “meet other requirements prescribed by
Chinese government” (fuhe guojia qita youguan guiding符合国家其他有关
规定, art.12 §7 and art.14 §7). Moreover, article 27 imposes requirements
in terms of domain name content (as translated by CNNIC):
Any of the following contents shall not be included in any domain
name registered and used by any organization or individual:
1) Those that are against the basic principles prescribed in the Consti-
tution;
2) Those jeopardize national security, leak state secrets, intend to over-
turn the government, or disrupt of state integrity;
3) Those harm national honor and national interests;
4) Those instigate hostility or discrimination between different nation-
alities, or disrupt the national solidarity;
5) Those violate the state religion policies or propagate cult and feudal
superstition;
6) Those spread rumors, disturb public order or disrupt social stability;
7) Those spread pornography, obscenity, gambling, violence, homicide,
terror or instigate crimes;
8) Those insult, libel against others and infringe other people's legal
rights and interests; or
9) Other contents prohibited in laws, rules and administrative regula-
tions.
This control is not limited to the choice of domain names per se but also
includes the content of websites. As stated in article 35, “Domain Name Reg-
istry and Domain Name Registrars have the obligation to conduct website
inspection in coordination with the national governing departments, and to
request to suspend or cease the resolution service of the domain name con-
cerned.” In other terms, non-compliance with censorship rules can result in
the termination of a website’s domain name registration in China. 
The registration of domain names is also subject to the “Real Name Sys-
tem” that applies to most Internet services in China. Upon registration, ap-
plicants must provide their identification card number along with other
documents, such as business licence numbers in the case of companies. (20)
Such concrete registration requirements often raise concerns because they
can restrict access to certain categories of applicants. For example, at the end
of 2009, as part of a crackdown against domain names considered illegiti-
mate, a Notification about Further Enhancement of Auditing Domain Name
Registration Information (21) effectively limited the registration of “.cn” domain
names to Chinese companies by requiring a Chinese business licence number,
with retroactive effect. New registrations were therefore impossible for indi-
viduals or foreign companies, unless the latter registered through a Chinese
subsidiary. Already registered websites were also asked to provide additional
documents. This resulted in the end of “.cn” registrations by the American reg-
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istrar GoDaddy. (22) As a result of this crackdown and of the subsequent can-
cellation of domain name registrations by CNNIC, the number of “.cn” domain
names plummeted from 13,459,133 at the end of 2009 (23) to 4,349,524 at
the end of 2010. (24) Individuals and foreigners were able to register again in
2012 when CNNIC published new Implementing Rules of Domain Name Reg-
istration, (25) and CNNIC now lists some 29 overseas registrars on its website.
In July 2015 there were 12,251,342 registered “.cn” websites. (26)
To sum up, both domestic and foreign registrars must be accredited by
CNNIC to provide registration for “.cn” extensions. Chinese registrars can
provide registration services for domain names set up overseas such as
“.com,” provided they are accredited by the corresponding registries, but
they must also get authorisation from the MIIT. Finally, Chinese individuals
and companies can get a domain name abroad for their websites via a for-
eign registrar, in which case their registration would not be subject to Chi-
nese laws, but this might complicate their business relationships by
requiring them to use English language and foreign currencies, for instance.
In this case, the attraction of the Chinese market is an incentive for foreign
registrars to set up offices in China, with Chinese-speaking customer service,
in the same time zone as their customers, and servers located in China for
faster response. For this, they must seek approval from the Chinese authorities. 
In other words, the delicate balance between state control and market
demand that has characterised the situation of the Chinese media since the
1990s and early 2000s (27) is also true for the registration of domain names.
Beyond political motives, which may influence a minority of website own-
ers’ choices, practical concerns seem to weigh a lot in this balance. Simplic-
ity and speed of service seem sufficient to keep the majority of Chinese
website owners in the hands of China-based service providers, and some
foreign service providers are willing to set up infrastructure in China,
whereas ill-designed administrative rules can also drive more websites
abroad, outside of the reach of Chinese institutions. 
Indeed, the possibility for customers to register a domain name abroad also
puts some pressure on the Chinese authorities. As underlined by the head of a
registry operating in China, “If administrative registration requirements are too
burdensome to register a ‘.cn’ domain name, Chinese entrepreneurs can choose
to register their domain name in ‘.com’.” (28) Of course, such websites registered
abroad would still be subject to the threat of domain name blocking, but as
seen in terms of the Chinese authorities’ interests, this would enable much less
refined control over the website’s activities than a local registration, which en-
courages self-censorship and enables daily updates on sensitive issues. It would
also mean less local revenue from registrations. 
CNNIC itself says that it is seeking “to enhanc[e] competitiveness in the over-
seas market” through improved quality of service. (29)To improve overseas access
and service, CNNIC gradually set up servers in many countries around the
world. (30)These servers are able to provide quicker routing information for any-
one in a foreign country looking to access Chinese websites. China also hosts
mirrors of several of the global “root servers” on Chinese territory, (31) which
could enhance access to the global Internet for Chinese Internet users. 
All in all, the Chinese network is increasingly interconnected with the rest
of the world, and at the same time is relatively less dependent on foreign in-
frastructure. This increasing interconnectedness makes China an important
actor and stakeholder in the stability of the global Internet infrastructure. This
may also contribute to reducing a perceived, though quite virtual, risk of being
excluded from the global Internet by other major actors of the network. (32)
This makes the DNS a very interesting place to observe the articulation
between Chinese claims to cyber-sovereignty and their efforts to achieve
global connectivity. Since the creation of the “.cn” domain name, this has
been a delicate balance to maintain for the institutions that manage the
DNS in China, being in charge of the interpretation and implementation
of national regulations while working on the practicalities of making the
Chinese and foreign networks interoperable.
Defining “cyber-sovereignty” for the Chinese
DNS
1990-1998: Relocating and centralising the manage-
ment of domain names
As in many other countries, the Chinese Internet started off mainly within
the academic community and in cooperation with foreign counterparts. The
academic partnership between Pr. Wang Yunfeng at the Chinese Academy
of Sciences (CAS) and Pr. Werner Zorn at Karlsruhe University played a par-
ticularly important role in setting up a ccTLD for China. When the “.cn” ex-
tension was created at the end of November 1990, the server was located
in Karlsruhe, with Pr. Qian Tianbai as an administrative contact in China. It
remained this way until 21 May 1995. Then: 
With the assistance of Pr. Qian Tianbai and Karlsruhe University, the
Computer network information center of CAS finished setting up China’s
top domain name (CN) servers, after which the .CN domain name
servers were no longer located abroad. Qian Tianbai and Qian Hualin
were the administrative contact and technical contact respectively. (33)
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Special feature
This was also the time when Internet access became available outside of
academic circles with the creation of commercial services. In January 1996,
the State Council set up a Leading Panel for Informationisation Work to pro-
mote but also regulate this development in a more coordinated manner. As
stated by Xue Hong, from then on, “the Internet and the ‘.CN’ domain were
subject to governmental administration. Accordingly, the possibility of self-
governance of the Internet was terminated.” (34) Indeed, the Leading Panel
issued the Interim Provisions for Administration of Domain Name Registra-
tion of Internet in China (35) on 30 May 1997, thereby putting the manage-
ment of the “.cn” domain names into the hands of the newly-founded
CNNIC at the Chinese Academy of Sciences. By 1998, the Leading Panel’s
regulatory responsibilities were transferred to the new Ministry of Informa-
tion Industry (MII), (36) which would be further reformed in 2008 to become
the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT). (37)
With these reforms, the technical, daily management of domain names
remained in the hands of the CAS, an academic institution (though tradi-
tionally close to central power), via CNNIC, while the regulatory power over
this system was entrusted to a newly formed and ambitious ministry in
charge of the technological modernisation of the country and of the control
of the Internet. 
Having relocated and recentralised the management of domain names
within China by 1998, the Chinese government was in a better position to
voice complaints about the global governance of domain names. 
2000s: Calls for an intergovernmental model, more
compatible with “cyber-sovereignty”
Public statements from Chinese officials have been quite consistent over
the 2000s in defence of the principle of “sovereignty” and of an intergov-
ernmental plot. This translated into repeated criticism against ICANN in
its global coordination of the allocation of IP addresses and of top-level
domain names. ICANN was founded, like CNNIC, in 1998, at the time of
the massive popularisation and commercialisation of the Internet. Also fac-
ing the need to take the management of domain names out of the hands
of its founder academics, who were no longer able to cope with the expo-
nential growth of websites globally, but also willing to limit its involvement
in the matter, the US government pushed for a more privatised system su-
pervised by the Department of Commerce. (38) After some turmoil, ICANN
was established as a California-based non-profit corporation with an in-
novative, evolving governance model called “multi-stakeholder.” At ICANN,
civil society organisations, businesses involved in the DNS, and individuals
can all have a say, as well as government representatives, through complex
consensus-building procedures. (39)
This system is often criticised for its sustained links with the American
government, and for its bias towards lobbies and developed countries, which
have more resources to pay experts and to send participants to ICANN con-
ferences around the world. All through the 2000s, Chinese representatives
have been vocal in this public criticism and have been advocating for an in-
tergovernmental system under the United Nations, which would allegedly
rebalance the decision-making process towards developing countries and
the defence of public interest.
In April 2002, Zhao Houlin, then Director of the Telecommunication Stan-
dardisation Bureau of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), a
UN organisation, proposed “that ITU could provide support for ICANN and
help it to overcome its current difficulties.” (40) In November of the same
year, the Chinese official press announced that CNNIC and the Internet So-
ciety of China had demanded a reform of ICANN. (41) In 2003, at the UN-
sponsored World Summit for the Information Society (WSIS) in Geneva,
Wang Xudong, the Chinese Minister of Information Industry, appealed “for
more participation and coordination by intergovernmental organiza-
tions.” (42) Such attacks against ICANN were reiterated during the 2005 WSIS
meeting in Tunis, (43) and China joined other countries at the 2012 World
Congress on Information Technology (WCIT) to make a proposal to transfer
the management of the DNS to state-level organisations. (44)
Other more specific issues also affected the relationship between China
and ICANN. From 2001 to 2009, China did not send representatives to
ICANN’s Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC) until an agreement was
reached to refer to Taiwan as “Chinese Taipei.” (45)
The Chinese position was articulated in a more comprehensive way in a
White Paper on the Internet in China, published by the Information Office
of the State Council in 2010. (46) In this report, the Chinese government de-
clared that, “though connected, the Internet of various countries belongs
to different sovereignties,” and further “holds that the role of the UN should
be given full scope in international Internet administration.” 
Chinese bottom-up participation in the global gover-
nance of the DNS
However, while Chinese government representatives showed reluctance
to give credit to ICANN, numerous Chinese engineers and researchers par-
ticipated and even took leading positions in ICANN’s meetings and working
groups, as well as in the Regional Internet Registries in charge of the allo-
N o . 2 0 1 5 / 4  •  c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s 29
34. Xue Hong, “Voice of China: A Story of Chinese-Character Domain Names,” Cardozo Journal of In-
ternational and Comparative Law, No. 12, 2004, pp. 559-592.
35. Guowuyuan xinxihua gongzuo lingdao xiaozu bangongshi (State Council Leading Panel for infor-
mationisation Work), Zhongguo hulianwangluo yuming zhuce zanxing guanli banfa (Interim Pro-
visions for Administration of Domain Name Registration of Internet in China), 30 May 1997, on
Baidu Baike: http://tinyurl.com/owqxprg.
36. For most of these dates, see also the CNNIC’s Internet timeline of China, www1.cnnic.cn/
IDR/hlwfzdsj/201306/t20130628_40563.htm.
37. “Ministry of Industry and Information Technology Inaugurated,” Xinhua via China.org, 30 June
2008, www.china.org.cn/government/news/2008-06/30/content_15906787.htm.
38. Laura DeNardis, The Global War For Internet Governance, op. cit., p. 62; Marcus Franda, Governing
The Internet, London, Lynne Rienner, 2001, pp. 51ff.
39. Milton L. Mueller, Ruling the Root: Internet governance and the taming of cyberspace, Cambridge,
MA, MIT Press, 2002; Milton L. Mueller, Networks and states, op. cit.
40. Zhao Houlin, “ITU-T and ICANN Reform,” ITU, 17 April 2002, www.itu.int/ITU-T/tsb-director/itut-
icann/ICANNreform.html.
41. “Zhongguo jianyi gaige ICANN tizhi,” (China proposes reform of ICANN system), Renmin ribao
haiwai ban, 23 November 2002, www.people.com.cn/GB/paper39/7807/742948.html; CNNIC
and Internet Society of China, “Suggestions on ICANN Reform,” 26 April 2002, https://
www.cnnic.net.cn/gjjl/gjyjydt/200312/t20031213_27765.htm. No traces of this could be found
on ICANN website. 
42. Wang Xudong, “Strengthening Cooperation, Promoting Development and Moving Towards Infor-
mation Society,” in Daniel Stauffacher and Wolfgang Kleinwächter (eds), The World Summit on
the Information Society: Moving from the Past into the Future, New York, United Nations ICT Task
Force, 2005, p. 56.
43. Milton L. Mueller, “China and Global Internet Governance,” in Ronald Deibert, Rafal Rohozinski,
and Jonathan Zittrain (eds), Access Contested, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2012, p. 183.
44. Amy Thomson, “China, Russia Resubmit Proposal to Get Web Control,” Bloomberg, 12 December
2012, www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-12/china-russia-resubmit-proposal-to-get-web-con-
trol.html.
45. Rebecca MacKinnon, “China @ ICANN: Thoughts from former CEO Paul Twomey,” RConversation,
3 July 2009, http://rconversation.blogs.com/rconversation/2009/07/china-icann-thoughts-from-
former-ceo-paul-twomey.html.
46. Information Office of the State Council, White Paper: The Internet in China, 15 June 2010,
http://china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7093508.htm.
Séverine Arsène – Internet Domain Names in China
cation of IP addresses, in a more bottom-up manner. A researcher at CNNIC
recalls: 
More and more people in our work units went to international con-
ferences. There were a lot of participants in the APNIC. We had two
representatives from China, one for Taiwan, (...) in total four out of
seven were Chinese speakers. We also participated in the working
groups to discuss the allocation of IP addresses. We also went to
ICANN. It was free of charge so we participated [mainly in the At
Large Advisory Committee, open to anyone]. (...) From 2003 to 2006,
[Qian Hualin] was a member of the board of directors of ICANN (out
of 19 persons). (...) They [government representatives] criticized
ICANN because they didn’t understand it well and they wanted to
keep control. We, at CNNIC, understood it better, so we had a good
relationship. (47)
The latest report of CNNIC reflects assiduous participation of its members,
mainly engineers, in various international instances. (48) As a consequence
of this hands-on participation, the critical declarations by Chinese govern-
ment representatives do not entirely reflect the actual behaviour of China
on the operational level, where it has always been represented and involved
in the development of policies and technical norms.
This could be explained in part by a difference in agenda between the po-
litical and technical communities, with academic engineering staff working
on technological development and trying to achieve global interconnection,
while political leaders put political control higher in their priorities. To many
of my respondents, this is also related to a “pragmatic” approach on the
government side, allowing the modernisation of the country without giving
in on official principles. 
The case of Chinese-character domain
names
Claiming legitimacy over the management of Chi-
nese-character domain names
The technical development and implementation of internationalised do-
main names can further illustrate how the delicate balance between inter-
connectedness and sovereignty was maintained throughout the 2000s.
The initial design of domain names only allowed using Roman characters,
excluding any other script such as Cyrillic, Arabic, or Chinese characters. This
was criticised very early on as one factor reinforcing the digital divide, forc-
ing entire populations to access the Internet in a foreign script. Besides,
many actors in the field had identified those scripts as a potential market
to sell more domain names, thus pushing for the adoption of more open
technical standards. (49)
As early as 1998, various registries had started exploring technical solu-
tions to introduce domain names in Chinese characters, and implemented
them on their own networks for trial. (50) For example, by August 2000,
Verisign, which at that time managed the “.com,” “.org” and “.net” top-level
domains, introduced second-level domain names in various scripts including
Chinese (which would look like “中文域名.com”). (51) These initiatives raised
criticism within the ICANN community because such domain names were
not compatible with any other networks, as long as they were not imple-
mented on a global scale. These domain names were not listed in any other
directories than the originating company’s, and Internet users’ web browsers
were for the most part not able to decipher these addresses. So these do-
main names created de facto “intranets,” or websites accessible only from
a single network.
Hu Qiheng, who at the time was “director of CNNIC’s working commit-
tee,” reacted by claiming that Chinese language domain names should nat-
urally fall under China’s oversight. She was not emphasising the need to
preserve a global, unique address system, but rather was claiming China’s
sovereignty over the Chinese-speaking Internet – which extends beyond
Chinese territory:
We think as 97.5 percent of the people using Chinese characters live
in the mainland and Taiwan, the U.S. government has no right to au-
thorize any company to manage Chinese domain names with Chi-
nese characters. A company shouldn’t be allowed to provide Chinese
domain name registration services in China without the approval of
the Chinese government. (...) Related Chinese departments have
protested to the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Num-
bers (ICANN) that Chinese-character domain names are quite dif-
ferent from the ASCII (English) ones, since they have unique (...)
cultural and historic implications. (52)
Meanwhile, in January 2000 CNNIC had also launched their own “pilot
system for Chinese domain names,” and the regulation was adapted to ac-
commodate Chinese-character domain names with the publication of the
Circular of the Ministry of Information Industry on Management of Chinese
Internet Domain Names (53) and the CNNIC Administrative Regulations on
Registration of Chinese Domain Names (Trial) (54) in November 2000. Ac-
cording to CNNIC’s “Internet timeline of China”: 
On November 7, 2000, the registration system for Chinese domain
names of China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC) was
upgraded in an all-round way, and began to offer the Chinese domain
name services with such suffixes as “.cn,” “.中国,” “.公司” and “.网络”
[respectively “.China,” “.com” and “.net”]. (55)
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Special feature
The integration of Chinese domain names into the Chinese DNS was further
consolidated in the 2002 China Internet Domain Name Regulation, of which
Article 7 states: “Chinese domain name is an integral part of the Domain
Names System of China,” and in the November 2002 Proclamation on Chi-
nese Domain Name System, (56) which specifically mentioned the three Chi-
nese character top-level domains, “.中国 ,” “.公司” and “.网络 .” They were
mentioned again in the March 2006 revision of the MII Proclamation. (57) In
2008, the MII issued a new proclamation, (58) founding the China Organisa-
tional Name Administration Center (CONAC), to “carr[y] out the testbed for
Chinese TLD of ‘.政务’ (Government and Government Affairs) and ‘.公益’ (Pub-
lic Interest) and run the registry for ‘.政务.cn’ and ‘.公益.cn.’” (59)
This distinction between top-level domain names (“.政务”), which were an-
nounced as an experiment, and second-level domain names (“.政务.cn”), which
were officially implemented, is crucial in terms of coordination with the global
Domain Name System. Top-level domain names were implemented in parallel
with the global system, not recognised by ICANN, and therefore only resolved
by Chinese servers. On the other hand second-level domains were resolved
under the “.cn” extension, as part of the global coordinated scheme. In fact, it
seems that every website was registered under both the top-level and second-
level Chinese domain names, which guaranteed interconnection with foreign
networks but also contributed to sending confusing signals about Chinese plans
for future development of Chinese domain names. 
In particular, a 2006 article in People’s Daily announcing the new regulation
stated, in a somewhat misleading translation, (60) that “[Chinese] Internet users
don’t have to surf the Web via the servers under the management of the Inter-
net Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) of the United
States.” (61) This contributed to renewed attention and confusion about a pro-
gram that had actually been initiated several years earlier. Neither was it un-
precedented, as similar experiments were conducted in other countries. But
these moves were often interpreted as a will to build a Chinese “Intranet.” (62)
CNNIC maintained that it was only a trial aimed at studying the feasibility of
the technologies, and Paul Twomey, then CEO of ICANN, insisted that the an-
nouncement was only about second-level domain names. (63)
The implementation of a Chinese-character Domain Name System in China
had a de facto pre-emptive effect in that it made it impossible for ICANN to
assign the related domain names to anyone else without risking an economic,
political, and technical conflict with China. (64) At the end of 2009, the MIIT
stated that there were 460,000 Chinese domain names in total. By 2012,
CONAC had registered 180 000 domain names in “.政务” and “.公益.” (65)
De facto international cooperation
In parallel with Chinese officials’ calls for sovereignty and their assertive-
ness in developing domestic schemes, Chinese engineers and scientists from
various institutions also participated in collective international initiatives
to develop Chinese domain names and ultimately have them implemented
within existing Internet governance institutions. 
In 2000 ICANN set up an “Internal working group,” (66) and in 2001 created
an “Internationalized Domain Name Committee.” (67) CNNIC soon submitted
a proposal on IDN management (68) to the committee, which may have suc-
cessfully influenced the drafting of technical documents. (69) Hu Qiheng
(founder of CNNIC and the Internet Society of China) subsequently became
a member of this committee. 
Chinese researchers from CNNIC also teamed up with their Taiwanese,
Japanese, and Korean counterparts to find technical solutions to accelerate
the implementation of internationalised domain names. In July 2000, they
founded a “Joint Engineering Team” (JET), which produced Guidelines for
Internationalized Domain Names (IDN) Registration and Administration for
Chinese, Japanese, and Korean. (70) The Guidelines were published by the In-
ternet Engineering Task Force (IETF), which has authority to develop technical
norms for the Internet globally. The document became a reference point in
the drafting of ICANN’s 2003 policy on IDNs, (71) which in turn gained clear
support from CNNIC, with the following statement: 
We support these Guidelines and are pleased to commit to adhere
to them in our implementation of IDNs. Recognizing that the Inter-
net community will gain experience with IDN registration policies
and procedures as the deployment of IDN services proceeds, we also
commit to cooperate with our peer registries and ICANN in good
faith to review the Guidelines at regular intervals over the coming
years. (72)
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Moreover, in May 2000, the Chinese Domain Name Consortium (CDNC)
was established to “coordinate and standardize the Chinese domain names
in a nongovernmental way.” (73) The CDNC was a joint initiative between
CNNIC and equivalent institutions in Taiwan (TWNIC), Hong Kong (HKNIC),
and Macau (MONIC), whose researchers would gather two to three times
a year, mostly at ICANN meetings.
The new ccTLD and gTLD
Although China was not a member of the Governmental Advisory Com-
mittee during most of the 2000s, it proved willing to take an active part in
the issues that mattered most to it, within the framework of ICANN if nec-
essary.
Around 2008, ICANN started to implement internationalised domain
names, including Chinese domain names. It became all the more important
for China to make sure that its interests would not suffer and at the same
time to ensure that Chinese character domain names, already in place
within China, would continue working under the new ICANN scheme. From
this perspective, the MIIT asked CONAC, in charge of the “.政务” and “.公益”
experimental top-level domains and corresponding second-level domains,
to coordinate respectively with ICANN and CNNIC. (74) In November 2009,
CNNIC officially applied to ICANN for the Chinese language country-code
top-level domain (ccTLD) “.中国” (“.China”). (75) Internationalised ccTLDs
were implemented by ICANN through a “fast-track” process, and “.中国”
was delegated in time for the inauguration of the 2010 World Expo in
Shanghai. This delegation, in addition to the agreement on the Taiwan issue,
may have contributed to the fact that Chinese representatives attended the
Governmental Advisory Committee again after 2010.
In 2012, ICANN initiated a vast project of opening of the domain name
market with a global bid for the creation and management of new general
top-level domains (gTLDs), including internationalised gTLDs. This bid had
major consequences in terms of expanding the market and reshuffling the
registrar and registry industry, and also raised a number of legal (intellectual
property, trademarks) and cybersecurity (cybersquatting, phishing) con-
cerns. The MIIT adapted Chinese regulations in preparation for this change,
making it compulsory for proposed Chinese registrars to apply to the MIIT
before bidding on ICANN’s scheme. (76) Within this controlled framework,
Chinese companies were encouraged to apply for new Chinese gTLDs. (77)
When the bidding operation closed, 54 Chinese companies and institutions
had applied for 39 Chinese-character domain names, but also 50 Roman-
character domain names. Meanwhile, non-Chinese companies had also ap-
plied for Chinese domain names. In total, 74 Chinese domain names were
proposed by 49 organisations from 15 countries or territories, including (only)
20 Chinese organisations. (78) Some of the proposed Chinese domain names
include “.中文网” (“.Chinese Internet,” TLD Registry), “.我爱你” (“.I love you,”
Zodiac), “.广东” (“.Guangdong”) and “.天主教” (“.Catholic,” Vatican). The two
domains “.公司” and “.网络” , previously run by CNNIC, were officially dele-
gated by ICANN and open for public subscription in July 2014. (79)
As a result of this privatised bidding process, Chinese institutions were able
to secure the management of key Chinese domain names, but foreign com-
panies also invested heavily in this field, betting on the potential growth of
the Chinese Internet market. Wang Hao and Liu Fei, researchers at the MIIT’s
China Academy of Telecommunication Research, compare this transformation
of the domain name market with the “Spring and Autumn period” of Chinese
history, with a multitude of little territories administered by local leaders. They
believe that it may evolve towards a “Warring States Period” as competition
eliminates smaller players and enables big transnational companies such as
TLD Ltd., Verisign, Neustar, Afilias (registries) or GoDaddy, Tucows (registrars)
to gain control over a large part of the new domain name landscape. (80)
Advancing China’s interests within the multi-
stakeholder model of governance
This state of affairs in which private interests play an important role in the
management of (Chinese) domain names is important to understanding the
position of Chinese officials in more recent years, in which domestic control
and sovereignty have been highlighted at the same time as a de facto ac-
knowledgement of the global, multi-stakeholder Internet governance scheme.
For example,Wang Xiujun, Vice Minister of the State Internet Information
Office, commented on the development of new Chinese domain names
with the following words:
First, China must maintain network security while vigorously pro-
moting Internet development; second, rights and obligations shall be
kept in balance; third, the development of network culture must be
guided by core socialist values; and fourth, international exchange
and cooperation in the Internet field must be strengthened based on
the principle of multi-stakeholder, democracy and transparency. (81)
Since 2010: Enhanced cooperation of Chinese 
officials with ICANN
Indeed, the cooperation between ICANN and CNNIC has considerably
improved in recent years. All partners and observers see the recent
change of attitude of China as a pragmatic move to advance its interests
and make its voice heard, in particular in the context of the development
of new general top-level domains and of Chinese domain names. 
Chinese representatives started to once again attend the Governmental Ad-
visory Committee at ICANN in 2010. From 2011 to 2013, Li Xiaodong (now
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CEO of CNNIC) was appointed vice-president of ICANN in charge of Asian
affairs. CNNIC announced his nomination with the following comment: 
[It] not only signifies that the reputation of Chinese Internet experts
has been increasingly recognized by the international Internet or-
ganizations, but also indicates the increasingly expanding influence
of China in the field of Internet and the constantly-enhanced soft
power in participating in the international Internet governance. (82)
Furthermore, China hosted an ICANN meeting in Beijing in April 2013. At
the same time, CNNIC became one of the “emergency back-end registry
operators” (EBERO), which are ready to take over the role of a registry in
case of a failure. In August of the same year, ICANN set up an engagement
centre in Beijing, hosted within the premises of CNNIC at the Chinese Acad-
emy of Sciences. (83) Fadi Chéhadé, president of ICANN, made several visits
to China in 2014. (84)
This does not affect China’s control over the circulation of information
on Chinese territory. On the contrary, it tends to enhance the Chinese actors’
control of critical infrastructure. Yu-chuang Kuek, ICANN’s vice president
and managing director for its Asia Pacific hub in Singapore, says: 
The Chinese government’s approach is fairly pragmatic. They are will-
ing to have a conversation and to collaborate to make sure the In-
ternet works. (...) If we come back to the structure of the Internet,
one layer is made of contents, with applications, with issues of data
protection, privacy, censorship etc. The bottom layer is made of in-
frastructures, with the undersea cables, ISP peering etc. ICANN has
a role in the middle layer, called the logical layer, to ensure interop-
erability [through various technical protocols]. The Chinese position
[of openness] applies to the logical layer only. (85)
This increasing cooperation is in part motivated by a need to provide bet-
ter, more reliable, secure, user-friendly service to Chinese Internet users and
businesses, which CNNIC has also been pushing for. The need to offer better
representation to Chinese Internet users also strikes a chord among ICANN
representatives. As many stakeholders, including EU countries and develop-
ing countries, have been advocating for more inclusiveness and accounta-
bility, and in general have asked ICANN to be more responsive to requests,
they are striving to improve the institution’s legitimacy, especially in the
developing world. China is a priority target in this agenda. According to Song
Zheng, head of the Beijing engagement centre:
China is the largest Internet country and it is rapidly growing. With-
out China, we cannot call ourselves inclusive. We have about 100
new gTLD applicants from China. We must provide localised service
for them. Now in our Singapore hub, we have over 20 staff who can
provide service in Chinese. It is a big progress. (...) We want to make
China an important part of ICANN affairs. (86)
A more dominant position within the multi-stake-
holder system?
As they are calling for more investments and cooperation with ICANN,
current official representatives tend to downplay the importance of the crit-
ical declarations of the last decade and now seem to endorse the multi-
stakeholder model of governance. For example, at a panel at the Bo’Ao Asia
Forum held in April 2014, Fu Cong, a representative of China’s Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, declared that “China does not oppose the multi-stakeholder
approach in Internet Governance.” (87)
The rhetoric used by Chinese representatives also shows that Chinese lead-
ers have realised that the Chinese Internet has reached a critical size, which
may enable them to weigh in on the decision-making process, not only
through government representatives, but also through the business and user
communities, who can now afford more intense participation in ICANN and
other fora. There are more and more Chinese participants in ICANN meet-
ings, especially from the private sector. In other words, there is no point fight-
ing the multi-stakeholder model if China can benefit from this system. 
In 2014, the US government announced that it intended to withdraw from
its role as a supervisor of the “IANA functions” performed by ICANN (in-
cluding the management of the top-level domain name data in the “root
zone database”). In the current scheme, the National Telecommunications
and Information Administration (NTIA), located within the American De-
partment of Commerce, is the authority that awards the contract to perform
the IANA functions. It plays a day-to-day clerical role in verifying that the
relevant policies and procedures are followed by ICANN in processing
change requests to the root zone database, and it periodically organises
performance reviews. The withdrawal of the US government from this
“stewardship” role raises crucial political issues of accountability and inde-
pendence along with procedural challenges. At the time of writing, the con-
sultation process for this reform is underway. Chinese representatives take
part in the discussion, notably with Li Xiaodong as a member of the IANA
Stewardship Transition Coordination Group. (88)
Meanwhile, the management of domain names in China was concentrated
again with the creation of the Central Leading Group for Internet Security
and Informatisation (89) at the beginning of 2014 and the transfer of CNNIC
from the Chinese Academy of Sciences to the Cyberspace Administration
of China (CAC), (90) which replaces the State Internet Information Office, a
body formed in 2011 under the State Council. The Chinese Internet is now
overseen by Lu Wei, the head of the CAC, in a direct, centralised, and per-
sonalised way (91) and it seems that domain names are perceived as a key
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issue in this field. However, Lu Wei himself has attended several ICANN
meetings, which is generally perceived as an acknowledgement of existing
institutions. It seems that concentrated management and enhanced coop-
eration with global Internet governance institutions are two sides of the
same coin.
Conclusion  
For China, the management of domain names has clear and strong impli-
cations in terms of information control and digital sovereignty. It is at the
heart of Internet censorship through the rules of domain name registration
within China, and through blocking access to websites hosted abroad. How-
ever, the history of the DNS in China suggests that metaphors such as the
“Great Firewall” or the “Chinese Intranet” can be somewhat misleading. In-
deed they do not help understand the fine line that the Chinese authorities
have been drawing between international connectivity, which is indispen-
sable to the modernisation of China, and selective control of online content,
which is perceived as essential to political stability. Creating a separate net-
work within China may have been the dream of some Chinese leaders, par-
ticularly at the beginning of Internet development, but it has so far proved
unfeasible both technically and politically. 
Instead, the concept of “digital sovereignty” now translates into a set of
domestic regulations and practices that help guarantee the compliance of
companies and individuals who operate on Chinese territory and cater to
the Chinese market (this is part of what MacKinnon calls “networked au-
thoritarianism” (92)). In fact, practical constraints such as the need to provide
localised, user-friendly service are strong incentives even for foreign com-
panies to set up local infrastructure and submit themselves to Chinese con-
trol. But there are likewise limits to the administrative burdens that the
authorities can impose on website owners and DNS service providers (such
as real-name registration requirements), for they may turn to overseas serv-
ices, which would cut corresponding revenues and reduce the fine-tuning
of control. 
This produces a form of “localised” Internet, rather than a separate Inter-
net. In that sense China pioneered the use of the DNS as a technical answer
to the political challenge brought to national jurisdictions by the transna-
tional character of online speech. It is one of the earliest and most signifi-
cant examples of what has become a global trend of restricting access of
Internet users to certain types of content depending on their location, for
various legal, religious, or moral reasons, and with various degrees of legit-
imacy. It adds up to other types of localising measures aimed at providing
tailored content to Internet users, with or without their knowledge, and in
any case it contributes to undermining the myth of a unique, global Internet
where every individual in the world would have equal access to the same
content.
This strategy, in tension between domestic control and international con-
nectivity, has direct consequences in the engagement of China with ICANN
and other institutions in charge of the DNS at the global level. While Chinese
representatives consistently expressed criticism of the multi-stakeholder
scheme, there were almost always Chinese engineers in key working groups
and meetings. China was thus able to defend its interests pragmatically
without giving up on its core principles of cybersovereignty. 
The case of the development of domain names in Chinese characters, such
as “.中国” and “.中文网,” illustrates well how China’s position has evolved
from the claim of Chinese sovereignty over the Chinese language Internet
to active participation in working groups for the development of necessary
technical standards, and to a strategy for gaining an upper hand within the
new, largely privatised global scheme. After a decade of rapid growth, the
Chinese Internet has reached a critical scale in terms of users, businesses,
and technical experts, which enables the Chinese to weigh in more on multi-
stakeholder discussions and above all to attract foreign businesses within
the reach of the Chinese jurisdiction, where there is by far the largest market
for Chinese language domain names.
In a 2012 article, Milton L. Mueller suggested that this “cybernationalist”
position was not a stable, early-defined strategy, but rather an “improvised
response to the contradictions of the socialist market economy.” (93) Indeed,
various episodes of sudden restriction or opening of the Chinese Domain
Name System suggest that these issues raise debates within the Chinese
leadership itself. The variety of actors involved, from political leaders to ac-
ademic researchers and to business owners, may also explain some of the
nuances of the Chinese position. 
Over the long term, the Chinese leadership has progressively concentrated
the management of the DNS closer to the central authorities, and it has
become more confident about China’s capacity to acquire a more dominant
position globally, not only through the government, but also through private
actors and individuals. This self-confidence has allowed China to adopt a
somewhat more cooperative attitude in the multi-stakeholder framework
in recent years. The participation of high-ranking individuals in ICANN
meetings is generally interpreted as a sign of good will, but it may also in-
dicate that the Chinese authorities consider these issues highly sensitive
and deserving of close attention at the highest level.
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